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The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 1 estab-
lished by congressional action a national policy for the management
and preservation of the quality of the environment. Section 101(a)
of the Act declares that:
[I] t is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in
cooperation with State and local governments, and other con-
cerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable
means and measures . . . in a manner calculated to foster and
promote the general welfare, to create and maintain condi-
tions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic and other require-
ments of present and future generations of Americans.'
In order to implement this policy for the achievement of compre-
hensive environmental goals, the Act imposes on the federal govern-
ment
the continuing responsibility . . . to use all practicable means,
consistent with other essential considerations of national
policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions,
programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as
trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;
* A.B., City College of New York, 1956; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center,
1960; senior partner, Cohen & Rosenblum, Alexandria, Virginia; Chairman, Virginia
Trial Lawyer's Association's Committee on Environmental Law; Vice Chairman, Environ-
mental Law Committee of the American Trial Lawyers Association; Associate Professorial
Lecturer, George Washington University Law School; Associate Professor, Antioch
College.
** B.A., Smith College, 1963; Class of 1972, George Washington University Law
School.
1 42 U.S.C.	 4321 et seq. (1970). It Is noted that this article deals specifically with
CI 101 and 102 of NEPA, the subtleties contained therein, and their interpretation and
application by the courts. For this reason, and in order to facilitate analysis of these
provisions, I§ 101 and 102 are reprinted in full in the Appendix to this article, at p. 702
infra.
2 42 U.S.C. 4331(a) (1970).
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(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive
and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the
environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or
other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural
aspects of our national heritage, and maintain wherever pos-
sible, an environment which supports diversity and variety
of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource
use which will permit high standards of living and a wide
sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and
approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable
resources.5
To insure that this "continuing responsibility" will be actively
assumed by all agencies and departments of the federal government,
section 102(1) creates affirmative duties which obligate those instru-
mentalities to conduct their activities in accordance with the goals
and policy enunciated in section 101; and section 102(2) provides
detailed operating procedures to assure careful evaluation of the en-
vironmental impact of agency decisions "significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment." 4
 These duties are phrased in man-
datory language:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest
extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws
of the United States shall be interpreted and administered
in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall [strictly
comply with a detailed series of specific procedural require-
ments].5
Thus Congress has expressly created a duty of compliance with the
national policy of preserving and enhancing the environment in both
the substantive and procedural provisions of the Act.
The legislative history of NEPA is replete with statements which
support the view that Congress intended to impose both substantive
42 U.S.C. 4331(b) (1970).
4 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
5
 42 U.S.C. § 4.332 (1970) (emphasis added). The procedural requirements established
by the Act are enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A)-(H) (1970). See App, at p. 703
infra. They are further, explained in the Guidelines issued by the Council on Environ-
mental Quality on April 23, 1971, and entitled "Statements on Proposed Federal Actions
Affecting the Environment." 36 Fed. Reg. 7723 (April 23, 1971).
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and procedural duties upon the federal government in the conduct
of activities affecting the environment. Senator Jackson, Chairman of
the Senate Interior Committee and manager of Senate bill S. 1075,
which became NEPA, declared during the floor debate:
The bill directs that all Federal agencies conduct their ac-
tivities in accordance with [national goals for the manage-
ment and preservation of the quality of America's future
environment] and provides "action-forcing" procedures to
insure that these goals and principles are observed. The
bill specifically provides that its provisions are supplemental
to the existing mandates and authorizations of all Federal
agencies. This constitutes a statutory enlargement of the
responsibilities and the concerns of all instrumentalities of
the Federal Government.°
The Conference Report similarly indicated that
the intent of the conferees is that all Federal agencies shall
comply with the provisions of section 102 "to the fullest
extent possible", unless, of course, there is found to be a
clear conflict between its existing statutory authority and the
bill?
While the Act does impose duties upon federal agencies and
departments, it does not appear to create any express individual right
to a healthful environment. The original Senate bill included a pro-
vision which recognized "that each person has a fundamental and
inalienable right to a healthful environment." 8 However, the bill as
enacted contains only the statement that "each person should enjoy
a healthful environment."° This change was ostensibly adopted "be-
cause of doubt on the part of the House conferees with respect to
the legal scope of the original Senate provision."' Notwithstanding
this change in language, persuasive arguments have been offered that
6 115 Cong. Rec. 19,009 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
7 Cong. Rep. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1969). A mechanism to remedy
problems of "clear conflict" is supplied in § 103 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (1970)
which provides:
All agencies of the Federal Government shall review their present statutory
authority, administrative regulations, and current policies and procedures for the
purpose of determining whether there are any deficiences or inconsistencies therein
which prohibit full compliance with the purposes and provisions of this chapter
and shall propose to the President not later than July 1, 1971, such measures
as may be necessary to bring their authority and policies into conformity with the
intent, purposes, and procedures set forth in this chapter.
8 S. 1075, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 101(c) (1969) (emphasis added).
' 42	 § 4331(c) (1970) (emphasis added).
10 Cong. Rep. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969).
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a constitutional right to a healthful and habitable environmental
created by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees against
deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law;
the Ninth Amendment's caveat that "the enumeration in the Con-
stitution, of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people"; the privileges and immunities clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment; and the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights." Regardless of the final resolution of this question of in-
dividual environmental rights, NEPA does create, at the very least,
a right to require compliance by the federal government with all
of the Act's operative provisions. This right is one "which citizen
groups, functioning as private attorneys general, have standing to
protect in the public interest."'
The Section 102 (2) requirement that all federal agencies pre-
pare and submit to the Council on Environmental Quality a detailed
evaluation of the environmental impact of any proposed major action
(popularly known as the "impact statement") has generated most
of the litigation under NEPA, and has received more favorable judicial
treatment in terms of enforcement than any other provision of the
Act." However, in the few cases which have considered the issue,
courts have thus far demonstrated a reluctance to find more than a
statement of congressional policy, or a declaration of discretionary
duties in the substantive provisions of sections 101 and 102(1).15
11
 See, e.g., Hanks and Hanks, "The Right to a Habitable Environment," in The
Rights of Americans 147 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971) ; Esposito, Air and Water Pollution:
What to Do While Waiting for Washington, 5 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 32
(1970); and Platt, Toward Constitutional Recognition of the Environment, 56 A.BA.
J. 1061 (1970),
12
 See Griswold v, Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
12
 See Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 Rutgers L. Rev. 230, 269 (1970), and cases cited
therein for a discussion of the standing issues involved in such citizen suits. See also
Comment, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas from Congress,
12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 571, 612-16 (1971).
14
 See, e.g., Texas Committee v. United States, Civil No. 69-CA-119, 1 E.R.C. 1303
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 1970); The Wilderness Soc'y v. 'Eckel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C.
1970) ; Sierra Club v. Laird, Civil No. 70-78 (D. Ariz. June 23, 1970).
is An extreme example of judicial reluctance to enforce the Act's requirements may
be seen in Bucklein v. Volpe,—F. Supp.—, 2 E.R.C. 1082 (N.D. Cal. 1970), in which an
attempt to enjoin as a violation of NEPA the disbursal of federal emergency funds for
road repair was denied by the court on the following rationale:
[I]t is highly doubtful that the Environmental Policy Act can serve as the basis
for a cause of action. Aside from establishing the Council, the Act is simply a
declaration of Congressional policy; as such it would seem not to create any rights
or impose any duties of which a court can take cognizance. There is only the
general command to federal officials to use all practicable means to enhance the
environment. It is unlikely that such a generality could serve or was intended to
serve as a source of court-enforcible [sic] duties.
2 E.R.C. at 1083.
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Two important recent cases illustrative of the broadest limits to which
the courts have been willing or able to construe NEPA are Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United States
Arm?' and Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc., v. AEC."
Both of these cases involved efforts by "public interest" groups to
enjoin actions by federal agencies which threatened irreparable in-
jury to environmental values. Both courts held that the procedural
requirements of section 102(2) were to be strictly and rigorously
followed but they declined to hold that the substantive provisions
of sections 101 and 102(1) were to be similarly enforced. This article
will show that the courts' refusal to enforce the substantive provi-
sions of NEPA frustrates the legislative intent of the statute and
impedes the Act's declared purpose of protecting the environment.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC. V. CORPS OF
ENGINEERS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
A. Courts May Enforce only the Procedural Requirements
of NEPA
In Environmental Defense Fund an action was brought to en-
join the construction of the Gillham Darn, which was to be built
across the Cossatot River in Arkansas as part of the Millwood public
works project. At the time the suit was instituted, approximately two-
thirds of the project bad been completed although work had not yet
begun on the dam itself. Opponents of the project contended, inter alia,18
that the "impact statement" prepared by the Corps of Engineers
regarding construction of the darn did not set forth a sufficiently
detailed examination of the important environmental factors involved.
Furthermore, they argued that construction of the dam would violate
their substantive rights created by Section 101 of NEPA. In par-
ticular, the plaintiffs claimed that construction of the dam and the
consequent destruction of the Cossatot as a free flowing stream would
violate their rights to "safe, healthful, productive and esthetically
and culturally pleasing surroundingsr° to "the [attainment of the]
widest range of beneficial uses," 2° and to "an environment which sup-
ports diversity and variety of individual choice."'
16 325 F. Supp. 749, 2 E.R.C. 1260 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
17 449 F.2d 1109, 2 E.R.C. 1779 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
18 Other causes of action alleged by the plaintiffs, based upon the Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and upon various federal statutes such as
the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934, 16 U.S.C. § 662(b) (1970), the Water
Supply Act of 1958, 43 U.S.C. § 390(b) (1970), and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1271 at seq. (1970), were dismissed by the court in five memorandum opinions
issued in the course of litigation.
18 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2) (1970).
20 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (3) (1970).
21 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4) (1970).
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The court rejected this argument, however, and held that the
Act merely reflected the result of a compromise by its sponsors which
declared a national environmental policy but "[did] not purport to
vest in the plaintiffs, or anyone else, a 'right' to the type of environ-
ment envisioned therein."22 Thus, despite a clear admission by the
court that construction of the Gillham Dam could defeat a substan-
tive goal of the Act, only the procedural requirements of section
102(2) were found to be judicially enforceable. In reaching this
conclusion, the court reasoned as follows:
In the instant case it is clear that the damming of the Cos-
satot will reduce "diversity and variety of individual choice."
It is apparently plaintiffs' view that upon the basis of such
a finding the Court would have the power, and duty, ulti-
mately and finally to prohibit the construction of the dam
across the Cossatot. No reasonable interpretation of the
Act would permit this conclusion. If the Congress had in-
tended to leave it to the courts to determine such mat-
ters . . . it certainly would have used explicit language to
accomplish such a far-reaching objective. In view of this
interpretation of NEPA by the Court, the plaintiffs are rel-
egated to the "procedural" requirements of the Act."
The court then found the original and amended environmental
"impact statements" submitted by the Corps of Engineers to be in-
sufficient as a matter of law for failing to comply "to the fullest
extent possible" with the detailed procedural requirements of Sections
102(2) (A)-(H) of the Act. Notwithstanding the fact that the overall
Millwood project had been authorized by Congress eleven years be-
fore the passage of NEPA, and was sixty-three percent completed
at the date the action was instituted, construction of the dam was
enjoined because (1) the Corps had failed to " 'utilize a systematic,
interdisciplinary approach' in evaluating the environmental impact of
the dam";" (2) "it [did] not appear that methods and procedures
[had] been developed in consultation with the Council on Environ-
mental Quality which would permit the defendants to assign values
to presently unquantified environmental amenities [and, thereby] take
into consideration, in estimating costs and benefits, the 'value' of
the Cossatot as a free-flowing stream"; 25 (3) all environmental im-
pacts, both positive and negative, which would result from the con-
struction of the dam were not set forth in the "impact statement";
22
 325 F. Supp. at 755, 2 E.R.C. at 1264.
23 Id. (emphasis added).
24 Id. at 757, 2 E.R.C. 1266.
22 Id.
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(4) unavoidable adverse environmental effects were inadequately dis-
cussed in the "statements"; (5) alternatives to the proposed action
had been inadequately explored; (6) the "statements" did not satis-
factorily "bring to the reader's attention all 'irreversible and irre-
trievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be implemented";" (7) the Corps had
not consulted with and obtained the comments of all jurisdictionally
concerned federal agencies before submitting the "impact statements";
(8) "the statements [did] not include the 'comments and views' of
all appropriate 'State and local agencies . . . authorized to develop
and enforce environmental standards' "; 27 (9) there was no indica-
tion that the statements, comments and views of all the appropriate
federal, state and local agencies had accompanied the proposed proj-
ect through the Corps' existing review process; and (10) it did not
appear that the defendants had studied alternatives to the proposal
although it "clearly 'involve[d] unresolved conflicts concerning al-
ternative uses of available resources.' "28
In ordering strict compliance with the requirements of section
102(2), the court gave a literal interpretation to the phrase "to the
fullest extent possible," which prefaces the two major provisions of
section 102. The procedural steps outlined above were held to be
mandatory, and to impose upon all federal agencies a duty to "ob-
jectively evaluate all of their projects, regardless of how much money
has already been spent thereon and regardless of the degree of com-
pletion of the work." 22 This interpretation of the statutory language
is supported by the legislative history. According to the Conference
Report accompanying the final version of the Act, each federal agency
was required to comply with the directives of Section 102 "unless
the existing law applicable to such agency's operations expressly
prohibits or makes full compliance with one of the directives im-
possible"
B. Enforcement of the Substantive Provisions of NEPA:
Judicial Usurpation of an Agency Function or Judicial
Enforcement of Environmental Policy?
It is undeniable that the court was correct in stating that Con-
gress intended that "[a]t the very least, NEPA is an environmental
full disclosure law . . . intended to make [agency] decisionmaking
20 Id. at 768, 2 E.R.C. at 1267.
27
 Id. (emphasis added).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 752, 2 E.R.C. at 1262.
so Cong. Rep, No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1969).
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[sic] more responsive and more responsible."' At the same time, it is
possible to take issue with the court's conclusion, based on the excep-
tion noted in the report, that Congress "may not have intended to
alter the then existing decisionmaking responsibilities or to take away
any then existing freedom of decisionmaking." 82 Relying on this deter-
mination, the court found that it lacked the power and duty to prohibit
the construction of the dam across the Cossatot because it could find in
the Act no explicit language which would permit such a result. Rather,
the ultimate decisions must be made not by the judiciary but
by the executive and legislative branches of our government.
This Court does not intend to substitute its judgment . . . for
that of the Congress or those administrative departments of
the executive branch which are charged by the Congress with
the duty of carrying out its mandate. The role of the Court
is simply to require compliance with the laws enacted by the
United States Congress s8
However, an independent reading of the language of section 102 and
the legislative history does not lead to such a conclusion. By evaluating
only the sufficiency of compliance with the procedural requirements of
section 102(2), the court, in effect, makes the agency the final arbiter
of administrative compliance with the substantive provision of section
102(1).
While recognizing that its function is to require compliance with
the laws enacted by Congress, the court seemed to ignore the fact that
section 102 has two major subsections, both of which must be followed
"to the fullest extent possible." Section 102(1) provides that all federal
laws, regulations and policies "shall be interpreted and administered
in accordance with the policies set forth in [the Act]." 84 The policies
of the Act are those enumerated in Section 101;" they are incor-
porated into the enabling statutes and ongoing operations of every
federal agency and department by the requirement that such statutes
and regulations "shall" be interpreted in conformity with those policies
unless there exists a statutory deficiency which prohibits the fullest
possible compliance. That section 102(1) was intended to be given the
same weight as section 102 (2)- is clear from the Conference Report,
which states that "the phrase 'to fullest extent possible' applies with
respect to those actions which Congress authorizes and directs to be
81 325 F. Supp, at 759, 2 E.R.C. at 1267.
32 Id.
88 Id. at 751-52, 2 E.R.C. at 1261. (emphasis added).
84 42 U.S.C. { 4332(1) (1970).
85 See text accompanying note 3 supra.
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done under both clauses (1) and (2) of section 102."" Senator
Jackson reinforced this position in the floor debate on the Conference
Report when he indicated that section 102 authorizes and directs all
"Federal agencies . . . to administer their existing laws, regulations,
and policies in conformance with the policies set forth in this act [and
to consider) the environmental impact of their actions in decision-
making.""
Notwithstanding this clear statement in the legislative history of
NEPA and in the Act itself, the Environmental Defense Fund court
reasoned that enforcement of NEPA's substantive provisions would
have constituted a substitution of the court's judgment for that of the
agency. However, the outcome of the case would have been identical
and in accordance with the court's reasoning and view of the proper
role of the judiciary if the sufficiency of the Corps of Engineers' com-
pliance with the policies of NEPA as required by Section 102(1) had
been reviewed as a matter of law. This would not have constituted a
substitution of the court's judgment for that of the agency; rather, it
would have been a determination of whether the decision to construct
the dam over the Cossatot constituted conformity to the policies of the
Act "to the fullest extent possible."
The court should have noted the governing principles established
by NEPA in Section 101(b) which declare that the federal govern-
ment is to conduct its activities in a manner calculated to achieve the
goals described therein through the employment of all practical means
"consistent with other essential considerations of national policy."89
The latter qualification must be recognized as a seldom-to-be-applied
exception to the national policy requiring avoidance of actions detri-
mental to the environment. This interpretation is supported by the
great concern evidenced by Congress in the hearings and other legis-
lative history preceding the enactment of NEPA, in the language of
the Act itself, and in the floor debates regarding the extent of environ-
mental degradation. In the floor debates on S. 1075, Senator Jackson
stated:
The basic principle of the policy is that we must strive, in all
that we do, to achieve a standard of excellence in a man's rela-
tionship to his physical surroundings. If there are to be de-
partures from the standard, they will be exceptions to the
rule and the policy. And as exceptions, they will have to be
justified in the light of public scrutiny.89
no Cong. Rep. No. 765, 9Ist Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969) (emphasis added).
87 115 Cong. Rec. 40,416 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
88 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970).
89 115 Cong. Rec. 19,009 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
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Furthermore, it should be noted that the qualification applies only to
other essential considerations of national policy and not merely to
"other" considerations. Thus section 101 imposes a substantive duty
upon all instrumentalities of the government to decide in favor of
preserving or enhancing environmental quality in a given case, unless
there is a contravening consideration of essential national policy which
justifies an environmentally adverse decision.
The determination of what constitutes an "essential consideration
of national policy" is a question of law which is properly within the
purview of the courts. Therefore, the burden is placed on the particular
administrative agency to justify a decision, regulation, policy or pro-
posed action which poses a threat to environmental values protected
by the Act, by demonstrating the existence of overriding considera-
tions of essential national policy. These considerations must be fully
articulated in order to enable the court to fulfill its interpretive func-
tion properly. The agency's failure to meet this burden and to over-
come the presumption in favor of the environment created by NEPA
must result in the setting aside of the agency action.
C. A Desirable Result for the Wrong Reasons
The decision in Environmental Defense Fund, which required
scrupulous compliance with the procedures mandated by section
102 (2), and which resulted in the issuance of an injunction prohibiting
further work on the Gillham Darn project until an acceptable "impact
statement" is submitted, will delay construction of the dam for an
indefinite period. It is also possible that the project will never be com-
pleted, for the opinion contains several "hints" to the Corps which
reflect the court's feeling that the dam probably should not be built,
and a veiled hope that the detailed evaluation and reconsideration of
environmental factors necessary to meet the court's standards for an
adequate "impact statement" will lead the Corps to the same conclu-
sion. This intent is apparent from the court's reference to the abandon-
ment of the project as a viable alternative despite the degree of
completion;" to the Corps' failure to take into account the value of the
Cossatot as a free-flowing stream in estimating the costs and benefits of
the project;" and to the "[m]ost glaring deficiency in [the discussion
of alternatives to the proposed action] : the failure to set forth and
fully describe the alternative of leaving the Cossatot alone." 42
The court found on the merits of the plaintiffs' claim that "the
damming of the Cossatot will reduce the diversity and variety of choice
of recreational opportunities and will reduce the choice of beneficial
40 325 F. Supp. at 756, 2 E.R.C. at 1266.
41 Id, at 757-58, 2 E.R.C. at 1268.
42 Id. at 761, 2.E.R.C. at .1269.
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uses of the environment in that region."" Despite these findings, the
court held that "no reasonable interpretation" of NEPA would permit
the conclusion that it could "ultimately and finally . . . prohibit the
construction of the dam across the Cossatot."" However, the court
attempted to achieve such a result by imposing upon the Corps so strict
a standard of compliance with section 102(2) as to be almost impos-
sible to satisfy. Although such an approach may provide relief for
plaintiffs in a given case, the decision will not suffice on balance as an
effective method of achieving environmental protection since all cases
arising under the Act will not necessarily involve the adequacy of a
particular "impact statement." More importantly, reliance only upon
the procedural requirements of the Act avoids the real issue, which is
whether the policy established by NEPA is to be recognized and
enforced as a matter of substantive law. The Environmental Defense
Fund court should have based its injunction on the Corps' failure to
meet its burden of articulating those considerations of essential na-
tional policy which would have rebutted the presumption created by
NEPA in favor of the environment.
III. CALVERT CLIFFS' COORDINATING COMMITTEE, INC. V. AEC
A. Flexible Substantive Duties: The Balancing Test
In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC," the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was. faced
with a situation requiring interpretation of NEPA in the context of
the issuance of administrative regulations which governed the applica-
tion of the Act to AEC operations. Plaintiffs challenged both the Com-
mission's approval of a permit to construct a nuclear power facility on
Chesapeake Bay, and the agency's newly-issued regulations concern-
ing the implementation of NEPA. In rendering a decision, the court
analyzed NEPA in depth; the opinion represents the most extensive
interpretation to date of the Act's substantive and procedural require-
ments.
Unlike the court in Environmental Defense Fund, which bad con-
cluded that only the procedural requirements of section 102(2) were
judicially enforceable, the three judge panel in Calvert Cliffs' held that
section 101 imposed an explicit substantive duty on federal officials to
"use all practicable means, consistent with other essential
considerations of national policy," to avoid environmental
degradation, preserve "historic, cultural, and natural" re-
sources, and promote "the widest range of beneficial uses of
43 Id. at 760, 2 E.R.C. at 1268.
44 Id. at 755, 2 E.R.C. at 1264.
45 449 F.2d 1109, 2 E.R.C. 1779. (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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the environment without .. . undesirable and unintended
consequences."4e
Although "Congress did not establish environmental protection as an
exclusive goal,"47
 the court noted that this duty could be fulfilled by
administrative agencies through responsible exercise of discretion,
since the Act "may not require particular substantive results in par-
ticular problematic instances." 48
In simplest terms, therefore, according to Calvert Cliffs', NEPA
"makes environmental protection a part of the mandate of every Fed-
eral agency and department."'" While the ultimate decision was
deemed to remain the prerogative of the particular administrative
agency, the Act was held to require that environmental issues be given
the same considerations as other issues within the agency's statutory
authorization. The kind of "consideration" envisioned by the court was
a good faith balancing of environmental factors at every stage of the
decision-making process. Specifically,
NEPA mandates a case-by-case balancing judgment on the
part of federal agencies [in which] the particular economic
and technical benefits of planned action must be assessed and
then weighed against the environmental costs; alternatives
must be considered which would affect the balance of values
.... In some cases the benefits will be great enough to justify
a certain quantum of environmental costs; in other cases,
they will not be so great and the proposed action may have
to be abandoned or significantly altered so as to bring the
benefits and costs into proper balance. The point of the indi-
vidualized balancing analysis is to ensure that . . . the opti-
mally beneficial action is finally taken."
The court in Calvert Cliffs' held that the procedural duties of
section 102 (2) must be fulfilled to the fullest extent possible, "a
standard which must be rigorously enforced by the reviewing courts."u
At the same time, the court suggested that the reviewing courts prob-
ably could not reverse a substantive decision on the merits under
section 101, "unless it be shown that the actual balance of costs and
benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient
weight to environmental values . . . ."52 These conclusions go further




Lio Id. at 1123, 2 E.R.C. at 1788.
91 id. at 1114, 2 E.R.C. at 1782.
52 Id. at 1115, 2 E.R.C. at 178.3.
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than any previous decisions in establishing that NEPA imposes judi-
daily enforceable duties upon all federal agencies to consider the
environmental impact of their myriad activities. By requiring com-
pliance "to the fullest extent, unless there is a clear conflict of statu-
tory authority,"55 the court has given judicial force to the expressed
intention of Congress that "no agency shall utilize an excessively
narrow construction of its existing statutory authorizations to avoid
compliance.""
B. Section 102(1): Judicially Unenforced Duties
Nevertheless, the court's contrast between the "flexible" substan-
tive duties of section 101(b) and the strictly enforceable "procedural"
duties of section 102(2) leaves ambiguous the legal meaning and
status of section 102(1). The court commented that the phrase in
section 101(b) to "use all practicable means consistent with other
essential considerations" connotes a greater flexibility than the phrase
in section 102 requiring the fulfillment of the duties enumerated in
section 102 "to the fullest extent possible." 35 However, such an inter-
pretation cannot be reconciled with the fact that section 102 (1) specifi-
cally requires that the substantive provisions of section 101 be applied
in interpreting and administering the "policies, regulations, and public
laws of the United States." Such a complete reading compels a recog-
nition that Congress intended to incorporate the substance and policy
requirements of section 101(b) into the requirements of section 102
without the necessity of setting them out repetitiously. In this way,
the court failed to note that the phrase "to the fullest extent possible"
applies to both clauses (1) and (2) of section 102. 56
While the court makes clear that section 102(2) requires careful
consideration of the environmental consequences of agency actions, it
is not clear under Calvert Cliffs' that any more than this agency evalu-
ation is necessary for compliance with NEPA "to the fullest extent
possible." The court did state that the requisite consideration of en-
vironmental matters was to be more than a pro forma ritual since "it is
pointless to 'consider' environmental costs without also seriously con-
sidering action to avoid them."" The court also held that even sub-
stantive decisions could be set aside if it were clearly established that
insufficient weight had been given to the environmental factors in-
volved in the case.
Notwithstanding the imposition of a duty on federal agencies to
53 Id., 2 E.R.C. at 1782.
54 Cong. Rep. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1969).
55 449 F.2d at 1114, 2 E.R.C. at 1782.
50 See text at note 36 supra.
57 449 F.2d at 1128, 2 E.R.C. at 1792.
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consider the environmental impact of their activities, the Calvert
Clif s' formula does not permit agency action to be set aside if the
procedures mandated by section 102 (2) have been complied with, and
full consideration and weight have been given to environmental fac-
tors." This approach undoubtedly will produce more reasoned and
responsible decision-making, but it does not assure that the purposes
and goals of NEPA will be furthered. Because the economic and
technical benefits of a proposed action are to be weighed against en-
vironmental costs, which are often intangible and not readily subject
to quantification, this balancing process will be vulnerable to the intro-
duction of subjective and arbitrary factors. The weaknesses and
potential for abuse of the benefit-cost method have been well docu-
mented," and they indicate that such a method is not presently an
effective tool for the protection and preservation of environmental
values.
Furthermore, the Calvert Cliffs' decision appears to permit, on a
case-by-case basis, any federal agency action (as distinguished from
any essential national policy action) in which the benefits compare
favorably with environmental costs, provided that the necessary bal-
ancing was undertaken at each stage of the decision-making process.
The court believed that the end result of this process, when carried out
in good faith, should be a strong likelihood that "the most intelligent,
optimally beneficial decision will ultimately be made."" Whether the
various instrumentalities of the federal government will in fact make
that "optimally beneficial decision" remains an open question. How-
ever, judging from the past records of the regulatory agencies, the
outlook is not encouraging. Unless Section 102(1) of NEPA is con-
strued as incorporating the substantive policy and goals of Section 101,
thereby requiring federal agencies to rebut a presumption in favor of
the environment by clearly articulating considerations of essential
national policy which justify environmentally adverse decisions, the
Act will fail in its overriding purpose!".
58
 For a discussion of the benefit-cost method currently employed by federal agencies
in evaluating environmental considerations, see Policies, Standards and Procedures in
the Formulation, Evaluation, and Review of Plans for Use and Development of Water
and Related Land Resources, S. Doc. No. 97, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). For recently
proposed changes in permissible benefit and cost factors including environmental con-
siderations, see the proposed Procedures for Evaluation of Water and Related Land
Resource Projects: Findings and Recommendations of the Special Task Force of the
United States Water Resources Council, Senate Comm. on Public Works No. 20, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
59
 See e.g., Hammond, Convention and Limitation In Benefit-Cost Analysis, 6
Natural Resources J. 195 (1966) ; Elizabeth B. Drew, "Dam Outrage: The Story of the
Army Engineers," Atlantic, No. 225, April, 1970 at 51-62.
60
 449 F.2d at 1114, 2 E.R.C. at 1782.
al For commentary dubious as to the real efficiency of the Act, see Note, The National
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IV. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC: THE
INADEQUACY OF THE Environmental Defense Fund-Calvert
Cliffs' APPROACH
The recent decision by the Second Circuit in Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC,a2 finally upholding the decision of
the Federal Power Commission to license the construction of a pumped
storage project at a site noted for its scenic and recreational values,
illustrates the inherent weakness of the Environmental Defense Fund-
Calvert Clif s' rationale. Although the case had been originally re-
manded by the court to the FPC in 1965, 68 prior to the enactment of
NEPA, the purpose of the remand was to require that adequate con-
sideration be given to environmental factors in accordance with the
Federal Power Act." In the second Scenic Hudson case, the court held
that " [t]he Commission is now obliged also to consider the environ-
mental factors covered by the National Environmental Policy Act.""
The court concluded, however, that the Commission had satisfied the
requirements of all relevant statutes, including Section 102 of NEPA,
and that agency findings were supported by substantial evidence.
Regarding compliance with NEPA, the court stated:
The policy statement in Section 101 envisions the very
type of full consideration and balancing of various factors
which we, by our remand order, required the Commission
to undertake. Like our remand, the Act does not require that
a particular decision be reached but only that all factors be
fully explored. The eventual decision still remains the duty
of the responsible agency."
Thus the majority in Scenic Hudson answered in the affirmative the
question raised by one observer: 67 whether an administrative decision
made after balancing all pertinent considerations, but providing for
less than full environmental protection, will be upheld.
Environmental Policy Act: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing?, 37 Brooklyn L. Rev. 139 (1970) ;
and Note, NEPA: Full of Sound and Fury . . . ? 6 U. Richmond L. Rev. 116 (1971).
62 453 F.2d 463, 3 E.R.C. 1232 (2d Cir. 1971).
65 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
64 Section 10(a) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1970), Emits the
issuance of licenses by the Federal Power Commission by requiring;
That the project adopted . shall be such as in the judgment of the Commission
will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a
waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce,
for the improvement and utilization of water-power development, and for other
beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes .. ." (emphasis added).
65 453 F.2d at 467, 3 E.R.C. at 1234.
60 Id. at 481, 3 E.R.C, at 1245.
ivr Schroeder, Pollution in Perspective: A Survey of the Federal Effort and the Case
Approach, 4 Natural Resources Lawyer 381 (1971).
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The dissenting judge in Scenic Hudson argued for reversal of
the Commission's order, without remand, because he felt that the FPC
had not complied with the court's original order. The dissent also based
its argument for reversal on the grounds of "aesthetics," in order to
prevent "impairment by the project of the mountain's scenic gran-
deur."' While such reasoning might be considered a substitution of
the court's judgment for that of the agency, it can also be viewed as
a call for judicial enforcement of Section 102(1) of NEPA. The dis-
sent argued that the FPC's decision to license construction of the
controversial project on Storm King Mountain was inconsistent with
the declared goals of the Act. In other words, the decision did not,
"to the fullest extent possible," constitute an administration and in-
terpretation of the Federal Power Act in accordance with the environ-
mental policies set forth in NEPA. In this case, a determination of
noncompliance with Section 102(1) of NEPA, as a matter of substan-
tive law, would have been a proper exercise of the judicial function.
It is difficult to understand why the Second Circuit did not di-
rectly face the issue raised by Section 102(1). If the court was hesitant
to set aside the FPC's decision in the face of an urgent power crisis
in the New York City area, the interpretation of NEPA advocated
here would not have required such a result. As the court in Calvert
Cliffs' noted, "Congress did not establish environmental protection as
an exclusive goal."' In imposing a substantive duty on all federal
agencies to protect the environment, Congress also included a limita-
tion with respect to essential considerations of national policy. Thus
the burden would have been on the FPC to prove that construction
of the project at the particular location in question was required by
considerations of an essential national policy; in this case the provi-
sion of an adequate supply of electric power to meet the demands of
New York City. If the agency failed to demonstrate that the environ-
mental costs which would result from the proposed project were out-
weighed by the essential need for the project at that location, a finding
of less than compliance with the policies of the Act "to the fullest
extent possible" would have been appropriate. The court would not
have been limited to a determination of whether the agency's findings
of fact were supported by substantial evidence. Instead, the relevant
inquiry would have been the extent of the administrative agency's
conformance to the substantive goals of NEPA in the conduct of its
activities. This inquiry is a question of law, as is the interpretation of
"essential national policy," and under the provisions of the Administra-
68 453 F.2d at 491, 3 E.R.C. at 1252.
614
 449 F.2d at 1112, 2 E.R.C. at 1780.
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tive Procedure Act" it must be decided by the courts, rather than by
the administrative agencies.
The foregoing analysis does not represent a strained construction
of NEPA. It merely requires that the language of section 102(1) be
accorded the significance which the words connote and which the leg-
islative history indicates Congress intended it to have. The analysis of
section 102 in the committee report accompanying S. 1075 evidences the
congressional intent:
The policies and goals set forth in section 101 can be
implemented if they are incorporated into the ongoing activi-
ties of the Federal Government in carrying out its other re-
sponsibilities to the public.
•
To remedy present shortcomings in the legislative foun-
dation of existing programs, and to establish action-forcing
procedures which will help to insure that the policies enunci-
ated in section 101 are implemented, section 102 authorizes
and directs that the existing body of Federal law, regulation,
and policy be interpreted and administered to the "fullest ex-
tent possible" in accordance with the policies set forth in this
act. It further establishes a number of operating procedures
to be followed by all Federal agencies .. . 241
CONCLUSION
Subparts (1) and (2) of section 102 are conjunctive and were
intended to have equal applicability. Section 102(1) incorporates the
substantive policy and goals of NEPA into the legislative mandates of
all federal agencies, thereby imposing an affirmative duty on these
agencies to preserve and protect the environment by avoiding or min-
imizing adverse environmental consequences to the fullest extent pos-
sible in the conduct of their activities. Section 102(2) establishes
specific procedures to guide federal officials in carrying out this duty.
The courts have demonstrated an increasing willingness to enforce
section 102(2) of the statute to the letter, prospectively as well as
retroactively." They have shown far greater reluctance to require
7° The Administrative Procedure Act provides that:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action.
5 U.S.C. 706 (1970).
71 S. Rep. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1969).
72 On the retroactive application of NEPA, see Note, Retroactive Laws—Environ-
mental Law—Retroactive Application of the National Environmental Policy Act of
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compliance with section 102(1), although the potential import of the
section has been noted by some commentators." The basis for this
judicial reluctance may be a disinclination to become involved in eco-
nomic decision-making to any significant degree. Whatever the rea-
son, however, the failure to require compliance with section 102 (1)
will lead ultimately to frustration of the legislative purpose of NEPA,
as the result in Scenic Hudson well illustrates.
APPENDIX
Section 101 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
provides:
(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of
man's activity on the interrelations of all components of the
natural environment, particularly the profound influences of
population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial ex-
pansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding tech-
nological advances and recognizing further the critical im-
portance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality
to the overall welfare and development of man, declares that
it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in co-
operation with State and local governments, and other con-
cerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable
means and measures, including financial and technical as-
sistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the
general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present
and future generations of Americans.
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this
chapter, it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal
Government to use all practicable means, consistent with
other essential considerations of national policy, to improve
and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and re-
sources to the end that the Nation may-
1969, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 732 (1971) ; and, in addition to the three principal cases discussed
in the text, see Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n v. Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132, 3 E.R.C. 1327,
1336 (N.D. Ga. 1971); and Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364, 3 E.R.C. 1338, 1340 (D.S.D.
1971).
73 See, e.g., Donovan, The Federal Government and Environmental Control:
Administrative Reform On The Executive Level, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 541 (1971) ;
Peterson, An Analysis of Title I of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1 ELR
50035 (1971) ; and Sive, Some Thoughts Of An Environmental Lawyer In The Wilder-
ness Of Administrative Law, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1970). The latter author opined that
"fsiection 102 . . . may be the most far-reaching section of the Act. If the words mean
what they seem to say, it may profoundly affect the operation of, and the scope of court
review of resource determinations made by, all agencies of the Federal Government."
Id. at 645.
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(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as
trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, pro-
ductive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing sur-
roundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of
the environment without degradation, risk to health or
safety, or other undesirable and unintended conse-
quences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and nat-
ural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain,
wherever possible, an environment which supports di-
versity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and re-
source use which will permit high standards of living
and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources
and approach the maximum attainable recycling of de-
pletable resources.
(c) The Congress recognizes that each person should
enjoy a healthful environment and that each person has a re-
sponsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhance-
ment of the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest
extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public
laws of the United States shall be interpreted and admin-
istered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chap-
ter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall—
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach
which will insure the integrated use of the natural and
social sciences and the environmental design arts in
planning and in decisionmaking which may have an im-
pact on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures,
in consultation with the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity established by subchapter II of this chapter, which
will insure that presently unquantified environmental
amenities and values may be given appropriate consid-
eration in decisionmaking along with economic and tech-
nical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal ac-
tions significantly affecting the quality of the human
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environment, a detailed statement by the responsible
official on—
(1) the environmental impact of the proposed
action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which
cannot be avoided should the proposal be imple-
mented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term
uses of man's environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commit-
ments of resources which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible
Federal official shall consult with and obtain the com-
ments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by
law or special expertise with respect to any environ-
mental impact involved. Copies of such statement and
the comments and views of the appropriate Federal,
State, and local agencies, which are authorized to de-
velop and enforce environmental standards, shall be
made available to the President, the Council on En-
vironmental Quality and to the public as provided by
section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal
through the existing agency review processes;
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate al-
ternatives to recommended courses of action in any pro-
posal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning al-
ternative uses of available resources;
(E) recognize the worldwide and long-range char-
acter of environmental problems and, where consistent
with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appro-
priate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs
designed to maximize international cooperation in antici-
pating and preventing a decline in the quality of man-
kind's world environment;
(F) make available to States, counties, municipali-
ties, institutions, and individuals, advice and information
useful in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing the qual-
ity of the environment;
(G) initiate and utilize ecological information in
the planning and development of resource-oriented proj-
ects; and
(H) assist the Council on Environmental Quality
established by subchapter II of this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
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